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STARTUP LAWYERING 2.0*
JOHN F. COYLE** & JOSEPH M. GREEN***
This Article describes the day-to-day work of lawyers who advise
startup companies. Drawing upon interviews with practicing
attorneys in New York City and the Research Triangle of North
Carolina, it distinguishes the practice of startup lawyers from the
practice of other types of corporate lawyers. In so doing, the Article
aspires to update and expand upon a sociological study published
in 1996 that described the distinctive character of the work
performed by startup lawyers in Silicon Valley. This earlier study
provides an account of what we call “Startup Lawyering 1.0.” In
this Article, we describe the work of startup lawyers outside of
Silicon Valley circa 2016. In so doing, we provide an account of
what we call “Startup Lawyering 2.0.”
We first describe how startup lawyers serve as transaction cost
engineers by preparing prepackaged documents, by utilizing
standard forms, and by providing nonlegal advice to their clients.
We then show that startup lawyers serve as reputational
intermediaries by screening clients and by vouching for them with
investors. We also show that startup lawyers serve as regulatory
compliance experts, transmitters of norms, and designers of
innovative billing schemes.
We further argue that West Coast norms of startup lawyering have
migrated to other startup ecosystems in the United States. The key
distinction for lawyering practice in the startup space today, we
argue, relies less on geography and more on whether a lawyer is
what we call a “startup law aficionado.” Startup law aficionados
can be found in any geographical region, though they tend to be
clustered in technology hubs. Silicon Valley is still such a center of
gravity in the startup world that startup law aficionados outside the
Bay Area will inevitably come into contact with Silicon Valley
startup lawyers and venture investors. As this occurs, the lawyering
* © 2017 John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
*** Senior Legal Editor (Startups & Venture Capital), Thomson Reuters Practical Law.
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practices of startup law aficionados outside of Silicon Valley
increasingly reflect those of their counterparts in Silicon Valley—
and repeated exposure only increases the effect.
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INTRODUCTION
Startup lawyers are lawyers who represent early-stage companies as
these startups seek to raise capital and grow their businesses.1 In many
respects, the work performed by startup lawyers resembles the work of a
traditional corporate lawyer. They draft contracts, negotiate with
opposing counsel, and generally seek to facilitate transactions that their
clients wish to pursue. In a number of other respects, however, the work
1. In this Article, we use the term “startup” to refer to an early-stage technology
company with the potential for rapid and scalable growth that might plausibly seek to raise
money from a venture capital fund and return the fund’s investment in connection with a
liquidity event, such as a sale of the company to a strategic acquirer or an initial public
offering. The term does not encompass businesses that would be unlikely to attract
institutional venture capital investment, such as so-called “cash-flow” or “lifestyle”
companies. See Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Essay, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-SafeSAFE, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168, 175–76 (2016). Whereas the primary goal of a startup is
to provide an outsized return to its investors, the primary goal of a lifestyle company is to
provide a good income to its founders. See id. Facebook, in its early days, is a good example of
what we mean by startup. A restaurant or a graphic design firm is a good example of what we
consider cash-flow or lifestyle companies.
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performed by these attorneys is quite different from the work of
traditional corporate lawyers. Startup lawyers often represent founders
who have little to no experience running a business. They must
sometimes wait for months—or even years—to be paid. And they are
often asked to introduce their clients to potential investors, a task that
typically falls to investment bankers in more traditional corporate deal
making.
In this Article, we paint a portrait of startup lawyering circa 2016. In
so doing, we update and expand upon the work of Mark Suchman and
Mia Cahill, the authors of a leading sociological account of startup
lawyering published in 1996.2 We refer to this descriptive account by
Suchman and Cahill as “Startup Lawyering 1.0.” This account of startup
lawyering has cast a long shadow over the academic literature. It was
and still remains the seminal work in the field.3 To date, however,
scholars have not sought to determine whether the work of startup
lawyers has changed in the years since the study was first published. Nor
have scholars sought to determine whether this account of startup
lawyering accurately describes the work performed by lawyers who
represent early-stage companies outside of Silicon Valley.4
This Article updates and expands upon this prevailing account of
startup lawyering. In so doing, it offers an account of what we call

2. Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679 (1996).
Drawing upon interviews with Silicon Valley lawyers, Suchman and Cahill observed that
startup lawyers facilitated venture capital transactions in three ways. First, the lawyers did not
insist that their startup clients pay for services when rendered. Id. at 691–92. Instead, they
would defer fees for unfunded companies or take equity in lieu of cash. Id. at 692. Second,
these attorneys enforced a normative order that increased the stability of the local venture
capital market. Id. at 697. They refused to take clients who might challenge the community’s
assumptions, indoctrinated their clients into the routines of the local business community, and
steered startups to appropriate investors. Id. at 698–702. Third, these attorneys developed
local norms that created a shared frame of reference for attorneys practicing in Silicon Valley.
Id. at 703. They then sought to export these norms to other jurisdictions. Id. at 703, 705–08.
3. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 503, 513 (describing Suchman and Cahill’s article as “incredibly rich, both in detail and
interpretation”); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Why the Law of Entrepreneurship Barely Matters, 31 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 701, 701 n.1 (2009) (listing Suchman and Cahill’s article as one of the few
that addresses “the intersection of law and entrepreneurship”). Occasionally, scholars will cite
an earlier (and much shorter) article that reaches some of the same conclusions. See generally
Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A
Preliminary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555 (1989) (discussing the relationship between Silicon Valley
lawyers and the growth of the tech industry).
4. The sole exception would appear to be a 2014 article by Abe Cable in which he noted
that the model of startup lawyering pioneered by firms in Silicon Valley had spread to other
jurisdictions, such as Seattle and Boston. Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the
Outskirts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 163, 165 (2014).
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“Startup Lawyering 2.0.” The Article first assesses whether the
lawyering style described by Suchman and Cahill has evolved over time.
Is the practice of startup lawyers today meaningfully different from the
practice of startup lawyers in the early 1990s? Or is contemporary
practice broadly similar? It then seeks to determine whether the model
they describe varies by geographical location. Do lawyers who represent
startups in other parts of the country behave in ways that are broadly
similar to their Silicon Valley counterparts? Or are there regional
variations in the ways that startup lawyers behave?
To answer these questions, we conducted interviews with startup
lawyers in two regions—New York City and the Research Triangle in
North Carolina—in the late summer and early fall of 2016.5 Overall, we
conducted sixteen interviews. We interviewed nine attorneys in North
Carolina and seven attorneys in New York. Each attorney interviewed
was a law firm partner or senior lawyer who has worked extensively with
entrepreneurial clients over a period of many years.6 The insights
gleaned from these interviews suggest that the descriptive account of
startup lawyering developed by Suchman and Cahill twenty years ago
remains broadly accurate. In several respects, however, we uncovered
evidence that the portrait of startup lawyering painted by Suchman and
Cahill does not fully capture the nuances of contemporary startup
lawyering outside of Silicon Valley circa 2016.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief overview of
venture capital in the United States. Part II then describes the various
roles that startup lawyers play in contemporary practice and reviews the

5. We chose to focus our research on New York City and the Research Triangle as
representative examples of large and small East Coast tech hubs, respectively. New York has
grown to be the second-largest tech hub in the United States, second only to the San
Francisco Bay Area (which includes Silicon Valley and San Jose). See PITCHBOOK DATA,
INC., US VENTURE ECOSYSTEM: FACTBOOK 5 (2016), https://files.pitchbook.com/pdf
/PitchBook_2016_US_Venture_Ecosystem_FactBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY6L-VDXS].
The Research Triangle, including the cities of Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill in North
Carolina, has long been a hub for life sciences companies and technology startups, but unlike
New York, remains a small and somewhat isolated startup ecosystem. See Region’s Vibrant
Entrepreneurial Environment Boosts Jobs and Investment, RES. TRIANGLE REGION, http://
www.researchtriangle.org/news-and-events/regions-vibrant-entrepreneurial-environment-boosts
-jobs-and-investment [https://perma.cc/FW75-SX9V]; see also Renee Morad, 10 Biotech Firms
Rapidly Expanding in North Carolina, BIOSPACE (July 21, 2015, 5:01:57 AM), http://www
.biospace.com/News/10-biotech-firms-rapidly-expanding-in-north/384976 [https://perma.cc
/B533-HMVS]. We also chose these hubs because one of us is based in New York and the
other in Chapel Hill, so our networks yielded the greatest number of experienced startup
lawyers for us to interview in these locations.
6. On a number of occasions, the interviewee had previously practiced in Silicon Valley
and therefore was well positioned to explain the difference in practice between Silicon Valley
and the jurisdiction where he or she currently practices.
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similarities and differences found in these practices in different
geographical locations. Part III discusses the migration of Silicon Valley
startup lawyering norms to East Coast startup ecosystems and
introduces the concept of the “startup law aficionado.”
I. THE GEOGRAPHY OF VENTURE CAPITAL IN THE UNITED STATES
In the decades after the Second World War, there emerged two
primary technology startup hubs in the United States: Silicon Valley in
Northern California and the Route 128 Corridor near Boston,
Massachusetts.7 Both of these tech clusters produced large quantities of
venture-backed startups in a variety of technology sectors but
predominantly in three areas: (1) hardware, (2) software/internet, and
(3) life sciences.8 During the dot-com boom in the late 1990s, other
metropolitan areas developed nascent tech hubs. Cities such as Seattle,
Washington (home of Microsoft); Austin, Texas (home of Dell); and
New York City (which became known at the time as Silicon Alley) had
fast-growing tech ecosystems until the bursting of the dot-com bubble in
2001.9
Coming out of the Great Recession into the Web 2.0 era, many of
these secondary startup ecosystems experienced a resurgence in startup
and venture capital activity. By 2016, New York City had largely
overtaken Boston as the second-largest tech hub in the country.10
Metropolises such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.,
joined Austin and Seattle as significant tech hubs.11 During this latest
startup boom, many Silicon Valley startups and larger technology
companies began migrating from Silicon Valley to San Francisco,12
creating a massive technology hub encompassing the San Francisco Bay
Area, which now constitutes the largest technology cluster in the world
by a significant margin.13

7. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION
IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 11 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure
of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 588–89 (1999).
8. See Mary J. Dent, A Rose By Any Other Name: How Labels Get in the Way of U.S.
Innovation Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J., no. 2, 2011, at 128, 128, 134.
9. See Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Startups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 177 n.161 (2003).
10. See PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., supra note 5, at 5.
11. See id.
12. Jenny Belotserkovsky, Why San Francisco Is the New Tech Titan, Not Silicon Valley,
GEEKTIME (June 8, 2016), http://www.geektime.com/2016/06/08/why-san-francisco-is-the-new
-tech-titan-not-silicon-valley/ [https://perma.cc/3V7A-EX6D].
13. See PITCHBOOK DATA, INC., supra note 5, at 5.
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Smaller hubs that have long had local startup ecosystems also
expanded during this period. Examples of these smaller hubs include
places such as Boulder, Colorado; Raleigh, Durham, and Chapel Hill,
North Carolina (known collectively as the Research Triangle); and San
Diego, California.14 While the Bay Area still has startups representing
every imaginable sector of the technology industry, many other
ecosystems tend to be more densely populated by startups from
particular tech sectors. For example, Boston, San Diego, and the
Research Triangle have significant clusters of life sciences companies.15
New York, in contrast, has fewer life sciences startups, but a large
number of startups melding technology (software, in particular) with the
industries that have long dominated New York City’s economy: finance,
advertising, media, and professional services.16
These hubs vary across a number of different dimensions beyond
the sectors in which their startups compete. More mature hubs, such as
the Bay Area and Boston, have a greater number of startups that have
grown into large, prosperous public companies.17 They also have far
more institutional venture capital firms (“VCs”) headquartered within
the vicinity than the other hubs.18 Furthermore, a number of the
entrepreneurs and early employees of the more mature ecosystems have
become serial entrepreneurs and/or angel investors.19 That kind of
virtuous cycle is present to a lesser extent in less mature startup
ecosystems, even those that have grown tremendously of late, such as
New York.
Just as these various geographical clusters differ in size, presence of
local capital for early-stage ventures, maturity of companies, and sectors
14. Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 95–96 (2011).
15. See JONES LANG LASALLE IP, INC., LIFE SCIENCES OUTLOOK 3 (2015), http://www
.us.jll.com/united-states/en-us/Documents/Life-Sciences/JLL-US-Life-Science-Outlook-2015
.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW7M-2G8B].
16. Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovation, 94 N.C. L. REV.
861, 874 (2016).
17. See SAXENIAN, supra note 7, at 12–27 (describing the growth and development of
Boston and Silicon Valley and some of their respective companies).
18. See Tanya Benedicto Klich, VC 100: The Top Investors in Early-Stage Startups,
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/242702 [https://perma
.cc/8YB6-UV8H]; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Rural Crowdfunding, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS.
L.J. 283, 283–84 (2013).
19. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 292 n.35 (2013)
(citing Ari Levy, ‘PayPal Mafia’ Gets Richer, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-21/paypal-mafia-gets-richer [https://perma.cc
/2H76-UWC3]). Angel investors are “wealthy individuals who personally finance the same
high-risk, high-growth start-ups as venture capitalists but at an earlier stage.” Darian M.
Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1406
(2008).
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represented, so too are there differences in the types of startup
lawyering found in these technology hubs. A startup lawyer representing
a life sciences company founded by a professor at North Carolina State
University will face a different set of challenges than a startup lawyer
representing a software company founded by a college student at New
York University. To date, most accounts of startup lawyering have
generally treated it as monolithic.20 In the next Part, we show that while
there are broad similarities in startup lawyering practice in the United
States, there are also some noteworthy differences in practice based on
geographical location.
II. COMMON THREADS IN STARTUP LAWYERING
In theory, a company could draft and negotiate all of its contracts
without the assistance of outside counsel. In practice, it is common for
companies to hire corporate attorneys to assist with both contract
drafting and contract negotiation. In performing these services,
corporate attorneys do not prepare legal briefs, appear in court, or
engage in the practice of law as it is commonly understood.21 Instead,
they perform a variety of tasks that could be performed by someone
who lacks a law degree.22 A question that has long preoccupied legal
scholars, therefore, is what value do corporate lawyers add to the
transaction so as to justify their hefty billing rates?23 Or, to put it another
way, why do companies continue to hire corporate lawyers to perform
tasks for which no law license is required?
Legal scholars have developed three paradigms that seek to answer
this question.24 The first paradigm suggests that corporate lawyers serve
as “transaction cost engineers.”25 On this account, corporate lawyers
minimize transaction costs by drafting contracts that assign specific legal
risks to the party that is best positioned to bear them.26 A commonly
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
21. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 399 (2015) (“Unlike the litigation context, in which the lawyer’s
role qua lawyer is clear in the public imagination, transactional lawyers are often accused of—
or congratulated for—not being lawyers at all.”).
22. See id. (noting that some firms label their corporate attorneys as “advisers, dealmakers, or business planners”).
23. See Martha Neil, Top Partner Billing Rates at BigLaw Firms Approach $1,500 Per
Hour, ABA J. (Feb 8. 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/top_partner
_billing_rates_at_biglaw_firms_nudge_1500_per_hour/ [https://perma.cc/VQ65-98BT] (noting
the steady rise of hourly rates at some of the nation’s biggest law firms).
24. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 399–401 (describing the three paradigms).
25. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243, 255 (1984).
26. See id.
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cited example of such engineering is the representations and warranties
section that is typically found in merger agreements.27 The second
paradigm holds that corporate lawyers add value to transactions by
serving as “reputational intermediaries.”28 On this account, the law firm
effectively “rents” its good name to clients about which little
information is available.29 Thereafter, potential counterparties are more
willing to deal with the client—or to offer the client better terms—
because these counterparties trust the law firm that is representing it.30
The third paradigm posits that corporate lawyers add value to
transactions by acting as “regulatory compliance experts.”31 On this
account, transactional lawyers add value by “providing expertise in the
law and regulations that generally govern the transaction and by
understanding the rationale for the contractual provisions in the
transaction documents.”32 In contrast to the first two paradigms, which
suggest that lawyers add value by performing services that could—in
theory—be performed by any sophisticated actor in the marketplace,
this paradigm suggests that the value added by lawyers is attributable
principally to their skills as lawyers.33
It should be emphasized that these three paradigms are not
mutually exclusive. A corporate lawyer may add value by working as a
transaction cost engineer and by serving as a reputational intermediary
and by acting as a regulatory compliance expert. Indeed, a review of the
existing literature suggests that startup lawyers in Silicon Valley are
often described as adding value in each of these ways.34 While corporate
27. See id. at 259–60. The purpose of these representations and warranties, Gilson argues,
is to “remedy conditions of asymmetrical information in the least-cost manner.” Id. at 269. By
requiring the seller to represent that certain facts are true, and by requiring the seller to
indemnify the buyer if these facts turn out not to be true, these provisions incentivize the
seller—the party who can acquire this information at the lowest cost—to disclose any and all
relevant facts to the buyer. Once these disclosures are made, Gilson argues, the buyer is more
likely to proceed to closing because it is no longer worried that it is overpaying for the assets.
See id. at 270–71. Gilson also identifies an “earnout” provision as a contractual device that
facilitates the consummation of a transaction when the parties disagree as to the future
prospects of the business. See id. at 263–64.
28. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 400.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 400–01.
31. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 401.
32. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 486, 501 (2007).
33. See id. at 501–02.
34. See Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Costs Engineer?, 74 OR.
L. REV. 239, 245–51 (1995) (describing the various means—both contractual and relational—
by which Silicon Valley lawyers may reduce transaction costs in venture capital financings);
Cable, supra note 4, at 168–70 (arguing that Silicon Valley lawyers play an important role as
reputational intermediaries); see also D.E. Wilson, Jr. & Andrew E. Bigart, AML
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lawyers may also provide value in a manner that is not fully captured by
any of these paradigms, they provide a useful framework to evaluate the
value added by the particular species of corporate lawyers—startup
lawyers—that is our focus in this Article.
A. Startup Lawyers as Transaction Cost Engineers
In its most narrow and formalistic sense, the transaction cost
engineer paradigm emphasizes the role of contractual innovations
pioneered by lawyers that help their clients close value-enhancing deals
that would not have occurred if not for the attorney’s involvement.35 The
paradigm is, however, broad enough to encompass other lawyering
activities that reduce costs in the context of venture capital transactions.
In particular, contemporary startup lawyers serve as transaction cost
engineers by (1) developing sets of prepackaged documents that cover
formation and basic financing, (2) promulgating standard forms for
financing transactions, and (3) explaining the mechanics and dynamics of
financing transactions to their clients.
1. Prepackaged Documents
Increasingly, law firms that regularly represent startups offer a
“prepackaged” set of documents that allow their clients to incorporate,
secure funding from friends and family, and hire employees and
incentivize them with stock options.36 In some markets—including New
York, Boston, and Silicon Valley—some law firms are now giving the
forms away for free.37 In other markets, the cost of these packages is
nonzero but still generally affordable for early-stage companies.38 The
increased availability of these documents reduces the legal costs that are
often associated with launching a startup. In this respect, this
Considerations for the Fintech Industry, VENABLE LLP (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.venable
.com/aml-considerations-for-the-fintech-industry-12-10-2015 [https://perma.cc/94TQ-95PT
(staff-uploaded archive)] (explaining the importance of regulatory compliance in regards to
anti-money laundering risks for Silicon Valley industries).
35. See de Fontenay, supra note 21, at 400.
36. See Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm II, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug.
22, 2016) (“Our legal docs are prepackaged. We have form articles, bylaws, and the works.
The only case where this isn’t true relates to licenses.”) (notes on file with authors); Interview
with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 24, 2016) (“There has
been such a commodification of startup work here. We were the leaders in 2006 in developing
a prepackaged set of startup documents. Now, everyone does it.”) (notes on file with authors).
37. Daniel Doktori, What It Means When Law Firms and Startups Give Away Legal
Documents, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 10, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/10/documents-justwant-to-be-free [https://perma.cc/9ERR-FWQH].
38. See Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug.
24, 2016) (notes on file with authors).
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development represents a classic example of transaction cost
engineering.
The creation of such documents is a service that could be
performed by nonlawyers. Indeed, nonlaw firm legal tech startups such
as Clerky and Shake (among others) provide prepackaged sets of
incorporation documents that are not all that different from the
documents offered by law firms.39 To date, however, law firms do not
appear to be too worried about these competitors displacing them. As
one attorney explained, “You can get that document somewhere else
cheaper. You’re coming to me for my judgment.”40 At the end of the
day, therefore, law firms hope that startups that use the firm’s
prepackaged forms at the launch of their business ventures will someday
hire the firm to advise them in later, more substantial (and, therefore,
more lucrative) transactional work.
2. Standard Forms
In 2003, the National Venture Capital Association (“NVCA”)
published a set of “model” documents for venture finance transactions.41
In the intervening years, these documents have reshaped startup
lawyering in the United States. Prior to 2003, it was common for law
firms to have their own semiproprietary set of venture financing forms.
When two different firms had substantially different forms, contract
negotiations could be frustratingly slow, as each lawyer sought to
conform the proposed agreement to “his firm’s” set of forms. The
NVCA documents sought to address this problem by providing a
common frame of reference. Once everyone was working off of the same
basic template, so the argument went, deals could be concluded more
quickly, and the average legal costs incurred to complete such
transactions could be substantially reduced.42
All of the North Carolina lawyers we interviewed believed that the
NVCA forms had wrought a significant change in market practice—for

39. See Automatic Legal Paperwork for Startups, CLERKY, https://www.clerky.com
[https://perma.cc/787R-3KX5]; Create, Sign and Send Legally Binding Agreements in Seconds,
SHAKE BY LEGALSHIELD, http://www.shakelaw.com [https://perma.cc/M7AB-N28Z].
40. Doktori, supra note 37.
41. See Model Legal Documents, NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N, http://nvca.org/resources
/model-legal-documents/ [https://perma.cc/F76N-JRKV]. This set of model documents now
includes (1) a term sheet; (2) a restated certificate of incorporation; (3) an investor rights
agreement; (4) a stock purchase agreement; (5) a right of first refusal and co-sale agreement;
(6) a voting agreement; (7) a director indemnification agreement; (8) a management rights
letter; and (9) a model legal opinion. See id.
42. See id.
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them, the release of model documents was a watershed moment. As one
lawyer observed,
The NVCA model documents are widely used here [in North
Carolina]. The largest firms are too proud to use them, but the
smaller firms use them in their entirety. The model docs have led
to more standardized terms, which is wonderful service. They
eliminate a lot of unnecessary negotiation. They create a sense of
market terms, which is one of the most powerful concepts in
transactions generally. Fenwick’s surveys and the [American Bar
Association] Deal Points also help with this. These resources
allow schleps like me to push back and tell opposing counsel that
what they’re proposing isn’t “market.” Clients are never happy
when they’re the schleps. The NVCA forms, by establishing a
market norm, steer things in certain directions.43
Another North Carolina attorney emphasized the fact that the NVCA
forms help to establish “market” norms and discussed their ability to
reduce transaction costs:
The NVCA forms have changed our practice. They are really
helpful. Not everyone has adopted them. I’m not sure why. Some
firms use their “own” forms. We’re migrating over to NVCA. It
makes sense for companies. Some say that they are too “proinvestor.” I disagree. How many companies have a lot of
bargaining power? These forms help with efficiency at the venture
rounds.44
Still, another North Carolina attorney commented that the widespread
use of the NVCA forms, along with other standardized deal documents,
had helped to standardize the terms in the venture capital space more
broadly:
The biggest difference [in practice over the past twenty years]
relates to the standardization of legal documents nationally. Series
Seed. The SAFE. The NVCA docs. Just about every deal starts
from one of those places. The docs are much more standardized. I
think that Wilson Sonsini still uses “their” docs, and I’ve heard
that Cooley does also. Generally speaking, though, no client wants

43. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 24,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
44. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm II, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 22,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
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to start with docs that are not “market” and that means the
standard terms.45
Overall, the North Carolina lawyers viewed the NVCA documents as a
positive development in the market.
A number of the New York attorneys took a markedly different
view of the NVCA forms. Several of these lawyers questioned whether
the terms set forth in those forms could fairly be characterized as
“market.” In the words of one New York lawyer,
Most lawyers outside of a major tech hub need some education on
startup lawyering forms. They take the NVCA forms and think
that it’s the gospel. They don’t understand that [the forms] take a
kitchen sink approach and don’t represent market (particularly
for companies represented by West Coast or West Coast-style
startup law firms).46
Another New York lawyer commented on the benefits of the NVCA
forms when they were first introduced but was less enthusiastic about
their current incarnation and how they are being used by many startup
lawyers today:
The proliferation of forms has led people to rely on them as
gospel and allowed them not to really think about what’s actually
happening in the market. But you have to have the deal flow to
really be able to do that. We’re fortunate to be able to do that.
The NVCA forms used to be quite helpful. They weren’t over-thetop or over-lawyered. They didn’t have every investor bell and
whistle ever thought of jammed in there. Now they’re really a
detriment.47
A different New York attorney noted that, despite the forms being (in
his view) “investor friendly,” many of his clients were forced to use them
because many of the term sheets his clients received from investors
explicitly required using the NVCA’s model financing documents.48

45. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 19, 2016)
(notes on file with authors).
46. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 25, 2016)
(notes on file with authors).
47. Interview with Attorney V, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 14,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
48. See Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 22,
2016) (“The NVCA has an investor friendly set of documents, but term sheets include it as a
mandatory starting point, and that sets the tone.”) (notes on file with authors). The New York
attorneys who expressed these views generally came from firms that also have a strong
presence in Silicon Valley. Many of the Silicon Valley law firms still prefer to use their own
forms. These forms now largely track the language from the NVCA forms but tend to contain
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These contrasting perspectives notwithstanding, the development
and subsequent adoption of the NVCA model documents—along with
other standard forms—constitutes an example of startup lawyers acting
as transaction cost engineers. Nearly every attorney we spoke with
mentioned the relevance of the NVCA documents in their practices,
highlighting the influence of these forms in shaping the negotiations of
venture investments irrespective of geography. By attempting to
establish a baseline of “standard” language for the various terms
commonly used in these deals, these documents serve as a lingua franca
that facilitates venture-financing transactions across the United States.
3. Nonlegal Advice
Founders come in many different varieties. In some cases, the
founder is a serial entrepreneur who already has multiple exits under his
belt. In other cases, the founder has a brilliant idea and technical chops
but lacks experience raising venture capital or running a business. In the
latter case, the startup lawyer will often be called upon to provide
nonlegal advice to the founder. As one North Carolina lawyer
explained, “I try to help my clients understand how to negotiate and
understand the entire financing process. The highest value advice I
provide is in explaining the dynamics of the transaction.”49 In other
cases, the startup lawyer will advise founders on timelines and the
relative merits of prospective investors. In the words of another North
Carolina lawyer,
Clients often have unrealistic expectations about how long things
will take. . . . It’s typically a months-long process, though angels
can go faster. Entrepreneurs also tend to underestimate the
variety of VCs when it comes to value add. Some are going to give
you money and not much else. Others are going to give advice and
make introductions. It’s important to set expectations up front.
Sometimes it’s better to take worse terms if the VC in question is
going to give you a lot of value add.50

fewer investor-favorable provisions. The North Carolina lawyers, in contrast, have found it
beneficial to have a single repository of forms that all startup lawyers can utilize. See supra
notes 43–45 and accompanying text. The main difference in outlook appears to be driven
mainly by the expectations around what constitutes “market” terms, which for each of them—
depending on how much negotiating leverage their company clients have, on average—is in
the eye of the beholder.
49. Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 38.
50. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45.
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Startup lawyers in New York also routinely provide nonlegal advice
to startups. One New York lawyer likened the relationship to eventually
becoming a de facto co-founder of the company:
You’re not viewed as just a lawyer with startups. Large companies
have an expert for everything. With startups, you’re their partner.
Unless they’re a serial entrepreneur, they don’t know anything.
You have to advise them on absolutely everything. Once they
trust you, they look at you like a cofounder.51
Another New York attorney commented,
Startups have something coming up every day that they’re not
sure about and want to check in with you on. It’s a consigliere
type of role, a trusted advisor. That includes business issues,
especially for founders who are engineers or otherwise have no
business background. They want to know what is “market” on
business terms. It comes into play with startups much more than if
you’re representing a Fortune 500 company.52
On this issue, then, the practice of startup lawyers in North Carolina and
New York are broadly similar.
The provision of nonlegal advice to founders and startups helps to
reduce transaction costs across a range of different matters. By
explaining the dynamics of the financing transaction, or by explaining
the relative merits of two different VCs, a startup lawyer reduces the
information asymmetry between the founder and the investor.53 In this
respect, the practice of a startup lawyer is again fairly characterized as
that of a transaction cost engineer who adds value to the transaction by
reducing these costs.
B.

Startup Lawyers as Reputational Intermediaries

In addition to their work as transaction cost engineers, startup
lawyers often serve as reputational intermediaries on behalf of their
clients. This means that startup lawyers will sometimes “vouch” for
particularly promising clients by introducing them to potential investors.
It also means that startup lawyers will occasionally decline to take on

51. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48.
52. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 25,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
53. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm V (Sept. 16,
2016) (“For new founders (75% of my clients), they need some coaching, tutorial, realistic
expectation talks. I tell them: ‘Understand when you are negotiating a term sheet with a VC,
you’re fighting a gunslinger, and you’re totally unarmed. They have way more experience at
this than you.’ ”) (notes on file with authors).
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clients who may reflect poorly upon them. Each of these two forms of
reputational intermediation is explored below.
1. Screening Clients
In their seminal article on startup lawyering in Silicon Valley,
Suchman and Cahill argue that Silicon Valley lawyers routinely decline
to take on certain clients.54 While there are many reasons why a firm
may decide to take on a client, Suchman and Cahill note that one
common motivation for doing so in Silicon Valley is to “screen out
entities that challenge the community’s taken-for-granted assumptions
or that threaten the community’s social cohesion.”55 These firms often
refuse to take on a potential client out of a concern that the client would
reflect poorly on the firm in the client’s dealings with investors.56
Through this screening process, Suchman and Cahill contend, Silicon
Valley lawyers establish “normative boundaries” around the venture
capital community and maintain their status as reliable reputational
intermediaries.57
When we asked our interviewees about their client screening
practice, we received starkly different answers from the attorneys in
North Carolina and the attorneys in New York. The North Carolina
lawyers reported that they rarely, if ever, screened their clients in the
manner described by Suchman and Cahill. One attorney reported that
he had never turned away a client.58 Several others remarked that they
would refuse to take on a client if they had serious concerns about
management’s ethics or character.59 Three attorneys reported that they
would turn a potential client away if (1) the company lacked the
resources to pay up front and (2) the business plan was so unimpressive
that they doubted the company would ever be able to raise capital.60 As
one explained,
In choosing clients, you have to think like an investor and ask
yourself whether this is a quality company and if there is a quality

54. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 2, at 698–99.
55. Id. at 698.
56. See id. at 698–99, 698 n.58.
57. Id. at 699.
58. See Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 36.
59. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 44; Interview with
Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, supra note 43; Interview with Attorney II, North
Carolina Law Firm IV, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 26, 2016).
60. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45; Interview with
Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36; Interview with Attorney II, North
Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 59.
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team that is going to have the means to raise funding. If the
answer is no, then I might not take them on as a client.61
Significantly, none of the North Carolina lawyers interviewed stated—or
even implied—that they had ever turned clients away because they
threatened the community’s taken-for-granted assumptions.62 Nor did
any of them state that they regularly turned away clients who would
reflect poorly on the firm in their dealings with investors. The
overwhelming sentiment from these interviews was that startup lawyers
in the Research Triangle will generally turn away only those clients who
are unlikely to be able to pay. This is not to say that these lawyers will
not try to be helpful. As one explained,
I will also refer people to more cost-effective service providers. . . .
If someone needs help with residential real estate, for example,
I’ll send them to a solo practitioner who is a friend of the firm. Or
if someone is trying to open a restaurant or other type of lifestyle
company, I may refer them elsewhere for help with company
formation. In some cases involving solo entrepreneurs who don’t
have investors, I’ll even present the option of . . . using Rocket
Lawyer or Legal Zoom because an actual lawyer will charge so
much more.63
In discussing their policies for screening clients, none of the North
Carolina lawyers mentioned the policing of community norms or a
desire to preserve relationships with investors.
A very different picture emerged from New York, where most of
the attorneys we interviewed actively screened clients. One of them
stated his reliance on his existing network of clients to perform the
screening function: “We decline to take on clients without a referral
61. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45; see also
Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36 (“If he is asking us to
work for free, if he can’t pay us, and if his prospects are bad, then I’m going to say no.”);
Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 59 (“Generally speaking,
I may decline to take a client where they don’t have any money and don’t have the ability to
raise it.”).
62. One North Carolina lawyer did say that he has, on occasion, refused to take on a
client if he believed the client would not be coachable (particularly with regard to the
valuation the client seeks when raising capital): “Yeah, if their expectations are unrealistic, I’ll
refuse to take them on. Has to be really wildly unrealistic though. If they expect valuations
that are wildly unrealistic, it’s a big red flag for me. If they seem like a person who can learn,
I’ll work with them.” Telephone Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm V,
supra note 53. This type of refusal appears to have less to do with the client challenging the
community’s taken-for-granted assumptions and more to do with the increased likelihood of
the client’s unreasonable valuation expectations preventing them from being able to raise
capital (and pay their legal fees).
63. Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 38.
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from someone we know and respect. We only take on clients who aren’t
referred if they have something really novel.”64 Another New York
lawyer makes screening determinations based on a number of factors:
[I will decline representing a company] if it’s not the right
stage . . . where the idea may not be quite ready for our rates or
getting institutional investment. Personality fit is also important,
as it’s a long-term relationship. Likelihood of getting funded also
comes into play. We’ll often refer companies to cheaper lawyers
with the understanding that if they progress, and are able to move
the idea along, that we can revisit representation as they grow. We
want the environment to be right on both sides of the equation.65
Several New York lawyers focused on the company’s business model
and likelihood of successfully raising capital:
For us, there’s a sweet spot of tech-oriented companies that will
ultimately be financed by VC funds. If you’re going to have a
super successful cottage business that stays an LLC (i.e., a lifestyle
business), then we’re not the right firm. If we don’t think you will
be able to raise VC funds, by and large we won’t represent you.66
Compared to the lawyers in North Carolina, the New York attorneys
considered a much wider variety of factors—including personality fit and
connections within the startup community network—when deciding
whether to serve as a reputational intermediary on behalf of a
prospective client.
2. Making Introductions
In their capacity as reputational intermediaries, startup lawyers
regularly introduce their clients to potential investors.67 At first glance,
64. Interview with Attorney IV, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 14,
2016) (notes on file with authors). A number of our interviewees in New York stated that they
are first introduced to many of their company clients by the company’s investors with whom
they have long-standing relationships (and whom they have also often represented in other
transactions). See, e.g., Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48
(“The best way I find clients is through my relationships with the funds.”).
65. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, supra note 52; see also Interview
with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48 (“We don’t necessarily decline to
take a client, but sometimes we tell companies they might be a bit too early for us (not a lot of
need at this point). . . . We may not decline, but we’ll just not show them a lot of interest and
they usually take the hint.”).
66. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, supra note 46. Another New York
lawyer made a similar point: “Putting our MBA hats on and not our legal hats, we ask, ‘Is this
something that might be successful down the road?’ ” Interview with Attorney I, New York
Law Firm III, supra note 48.
67. Suchman and Cahill argue that Silicon Valley lawyers also serve as reputational
intermediaries by giving opinion letters in which they stand behind certain representations
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this might seem somewhat unusual. Outside the venture capital context,
it is rare for a corporate attorney to introduce clients to potential
investors; it is a role more typically performed by investment bankers.
Within the venture capital context, however, such introductions occur
frequently. One North Carolina attorney explained that introducing
clients to potential investors is “part and parcel of what it means to be a
venture attorney.”68 A New York lawyer responded that it “happens all
the time; it’s the most valuable service that we can provide to a founder,
I think.”69 Other interviewees stated that “clients are buying access to
my network”70 and that “if you’re not introducing clients to investors,
I’m not sure what you’re doing all day.”71 It is common, in other words,
for startup lawyers to set up meetings between clients and investors in
the hopes that the latter will choose to invest in the former.
Although these meetings are frequently arranged, there is no
guarantee that they will actually lead to investments being made in the
startup. One North Carolina attorney observed: “Even though I make
these introductions regularly, they do not happen regularly with success.
Very few startups get funding.”72 In some cases, clients will hire a
particular lawyer primarily to obtain an introduction to a particular
investor or group of investors. In these cases, the lawyer must set the
client straight. As one North Carolina lawyer explained,
Some clients come to us expecting that this is our primary role.
We disabuse them of that notion. No investor will invest in a
startup because we introduce them. It’s not hard to find investors,
and while there is probably some slight advantage to being
referred to them by us, it’s the wrong reason to hire us.73
Another North Carolina lawyer remarked that he carefully considers
which clients to introduce to particular investors: “I don’t want to send a
and warranties made by their clients. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 2, at 694–95. We do not
explore this topic at any length for three reasons. First, corporate lawyers of all stripes
routinely give opinion letters in connection with financing transactions. This behavior is not
unique to startup lawyers. Second, it has become less common in recent years for investors to
ask firms to provide opinion letters in venture finance transactions. Third, and finally, the
reputational backing provided by an opinion letter in the venture capital context is largely
chimerical. It is highly unlikely that an investor would ever bring suit against a law firm that
had given an opinion letter due to reputational constraints. See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 19,
at 309–10.
68. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36.
69. Interview with Attorney V, New York Law Firm I, supra note 47.
70. Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm III, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 26,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
71. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45.
72. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, supra note 43.
73. Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 38.
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startup to an investor when [its] business is well outside the investor’s
scope. I know one investor, for example, that relies on [business-tobusiness] software companies for deal flow, so I will only send
companies to him that fit this model.”74
New York lawyers had similar responses. One stated, “It happens
frequently; we’ll make introductions when it makes sense for both
parties. We have clients on both sides of the table and try to add value
where we can with the relationships we have.”75 Another New York
attorney commented,
It’s rare that something comes of it, but I’ll make an introduction
about once every couple months. I do it occasionally, but when
startups ask about it, I tell them I only do it if it’s a really good
match. Sometimes the startup’s not even a client and just wants
my intro to a fund client of mine.76
One New York attorney told us about a special department of
nonlawyer finance professionals at his firm that is dedicated to helping
introduce the firm’s startup clients to investors:
Oh yeah, [I make introductions] all the time. I view that as part of
our role. Unless they’re a serial founder, they may not have any
connections. The intro means a lot more coming from me, when I
can go to the right partner at the right fund. We even have
bankers who do this full time in-house. All they do is make
introductions for our company clients to venture funds (for which
we don’t take a fee). They’re all MBA former I-bankers who now
do this full time.77
One of the hallmarks of startup lawyering, in other words, is a
willingness to introduce one’s clients to the “right” investors. In so
doing, startup lawyers serve as reputational intermediaries on behalf of
their clients.
C.

Startup Lawyers as Regulatory Compliance Experts

Scholars have also hypothesized that corporate lawyers add value to
transactions by serving as regulatory compliance experts.78 On one hand,
a corporate lawyer may provide valuable assistance by advising a client
on a regulatory issue relating to a specific transaction (such as securities
74. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45.
75. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, supra note 52.
76. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm II, in New York, N.Y. (Sept. 16,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
77. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48.
78. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 32, at 492.
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law compliance in connection with a venture financing round).79 This
sort of regulatory advice is transaction specific. On the other hand, a
corporate lawyer may provide useful advice to clients that operate in
highly regulated industries.80 This sort of regulatory advice is client
specific. In some cases, therefore, a lawyer may add value by virtue of
the fact that she routinely advises on deals of a certain type. In other
cases, a lawyer may provide value by virtue of the fact that he routinely
advises clients that operate in a certain type of regulatory environment.
In the context of startup lawyering, our interviewees reported that
they generally do not provide regulatory advice of any stripe to earlystage biotechnology companies. At first glance, this may seem somewhat
surprising. Biotechnology companies seeking to produce drugs for
market, after all, operate in a highly regulated industry. The startup
lawyer’s regulatory advice is, however, rarely needed because the
founders in this space are typically quite familiar with the relevant
regulatory issues. As one North Carolina lawyer explained,
Most early-stage entrepreneurs in the life sciences arena have
experience in working through regulatory issues—experience
gained either during tenure at universities or at former life science
employers. Through these experiences, the entrepreneurs in many
cases have extensive contacts in the regulatory arena—consultants
who they have relationships or former employees who provide
guidance. It would be rare for a life science entrepreneur to come
in to the office and start a conversation with a request for advice
on regulatory matters—if you are in life sciences, there is a
significant probability that you have had direct contact with
regulatory specialists. So with respect to life science companies,
regulatory issues outside of securities matters are not major topics
of conversation in the early stages of the startup.81
Another North Carolina lawyer echoed these sentiments:
Our clients rarely, if ever, ask us to provide advice on FDA
regulatory issues. During development stage, the regulatory
function is handled by consultants or employees trained in the
areas, and legal issues rarely come up. Other clients may have
need on particular issues in late-stage/pre-approval development
and most often will use one of the DC-area FDA boutiques, given

79. Id. at 492–93.
80. Id. at 492.
81. Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 36.
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their proximity/connection to the regulators. Bottom line is we
have little or no demand for FDA regulatory advice.82
With respect to early-stage technology companies, by comparison,
our interviewees reported that they do occasionally provide regulatory
advice on privacy and security matters.83 As one North Carolina lawyer
explained,
[M]any information technology companies are being formed by
entrepreneurs with little or no experience in regulatory matters,
and we do in fact advise on regulatory matters—primarily privacy
and security. I would also state that this experience would apply to
young entrepreneurs as well as seasoned veterans—for the
veterans, there is someone in IT, or legal or regulatory affairs that
takes care of the security and privacy issues, but little interaction
with the young or more mature entrepreneurs.84
In summary, startup lawyers may occasionally add value to certain types
of early-stage companies by serving as regulatory compliance experts.
The precise extent of the value added will, however, vary depending
upon the company and the industry.
D. Startup Lawyers in Other Roles
In addition to their roles as transaction cost engineers, reputational
intermediaries, and regulatory compliance experts, startup lawyers
occasionally play two additional roles that distinguish them from the
typical corporate lawyer. First, these attorneys sometimes transmit
community norms to entrepreneurs. Second, these attorneys frequently
utilize nontraditional billing schemes that account for the fact that their
clients will often lack the funds to pay for lawyering services when
rendered. Each of these two roles is discussed below.
1. Transmitters of Norms
Startup lawyers in Silicon Valley play an important role in
“educating” clients in community norms.85 One of these norms is that
venture capital transactions are essentially nonadversarial.86 In this

82. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 44.
83. For a discussion of contemporary issues in privacy, see generally Jules Polonetsky &
Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 25 (2013);
Symposium, Privacy and Technology, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013).
84. Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 36.
85. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 2, at 699–700.
86. Id. at 700.
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respect, venture capital transactions are understood to be quite different
from loan agreements. As one North Carolina lawyer explained,
Where an investment transaction is done right, it’s a partnership.
It’s different from a loan transaction. The lender has to protect
itself. An equity investor has less to protect. VC investors have no
interest in middling returns. There is no reason to focus on
negative covenants. The structure should be to focus the startup’s
energy on the returns. There are some zero sum pieces of the deal.
But mostly the deal is about aligning interests.87
This perspective is not always shared by founders who have no
prior experience dealing with venture capitalists. These founders are
often wary of venture capitalists and are unlikely to view negotiations
with them as nonadversarial without considerable coaching from their
attorney. As the same North Carolina lawyer explained,
In the early 1990s, the predominant notion was that the VCs were
sharks who want to take over our business. My experience in
Silicon Valley was totally the opposite. That particular
misconception seems to have gone away. Some entrepreneurs
think they need protection, but really, there is a strong spirit of
partnership. The “us vs. them” attitude is out of place.88
One New York lawyer who had previously practiced in Silicon Valley
expressed a similar view, highlighting differences between those two
tech hubs:
In California, raising from VCs is so ingrained in the culture that
nobody questions it. Trying to scale a tech company without VC
money is pretty hard. In New York, there are fewer funds
headquartered here, so there’s less of a virtuous cycle and
relationship-driven culture like there is in the Valley. But I also
haven’t seen much antipathy towards VCs from our client base.
That may be self-selecting, though, if we’re representing them.89
When asked about educating founders about venture investors, one New
York attorney focused on encouraging his clients to find the right
balance:

87. Interview with Attorney III, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 38.
88. Id. Another North Carolina lawyer expressed a somewhat different perspective on his
clients’ perceptions of venture capitalists: “People do walk in with some knowledge about
angels or VCs and had some dealings with them. They’ve heard a lot about VCs, and what
they’ve heard they don’t like. I sometimes have to say not all VCs are assholes.” Telephone
Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm V, supra note 53.
89. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, supra note 46.
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Some entrepreneurs think of the VCs as being all knowing and
defer to them perhaps more than necessary. Others look at VCs as
being not on the same team as them, as having interests not
aligned. Neither approach is right for what a startup is in reality: a
partnership after the investment occurs. The VCs have tons of
market knowledge and relationships that can really help around
the table, but at the end of the day, the entrepreneur is bringing a
lot of value to the equation and shouldn’t feel beholden to the
VCs or like they’re the executors of the VC’s vision.90
Another New York attorney also found that sometimes his clients’
initial attitude toward investors was too deferential: “Most clients come
in thinking that it should be a collaborative process with investors, not
especially antagonistic. In fact, some clients are too trusting of their VCs
or unwilling to negotiate things they probably should.”91 However, other
New York lawyers still found that they had to spend significant time
disabusing their clients of preconceived notions about venture investors:
I have these conversations all the time. It happens more here in
New York than in the Valley by a factor of ten or more. Founders
come in suspicious of vulture capitalists and tell horror stories
they’ve heard. You have to take them by the hand and explain
that there are ne’er-do-wells in every industry, but you have to
find the right people.92
Another hallmark of attorneys representing startups, therefore, is a
predisposition to view venture capitalists as potential long-term partners
rather than adversaries. These startup lawyers often actively work to
instill these norms in their clients.
2. Designers of Innovative Billing Schemes
Startup lawyers represent founders and startups. In many cases,
these clients have limited resources.93 In an ideal world, they will—with
the lawyer’s assistance—raise money from investors. Unless and until
this money is raised, however, many of these same clients will be unable
to pay their lawyers.94 Startup lawyers address this challenge in two

90. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, supra note 52.
91. Interview with Attorney III, New York Law Firm I, in New York, N.Y. (Aug. 25,
2016) (notes on file with authors).
92. Interview with Attorney IV, New York Law Firm I, supra note 64.
93. See Susan C. Morse, Startup Ltd.: Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location, 14
FLA. TAX REV. 319, 342 (2013).
94. Id. at 347 (“[I]f startups have ‘no revenue,’ and ‘no product,’ they have ‘no future,’
and cannot pay their legal bills.” (footnote omitted) (citing Telephone Interview with Silicon
Valley law firm partner (Feb. 16, 2013))).
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ways. First, many firms will agree to defer the bills owed to them by their
startup clients until funding is raised. Second, some firms will take equity
in the startup client in lieu of cash.
a.

Deferred Billing

In many cases, startup lawyers will agree to defer fees until their
client raises capital from an investor. In some cases, the period of
deferral can be lengthy. One North Carolina lawyer commented that he
once deferred a client’s fee for twenty years.95 The practice of deferring
fees is necessary, however, because the clients often lack the ability to
pay for services when rendered. As one North Carolina attorney stated,
Normally we will bill startup clients monthly. They will rarely pay
on time. They’ve got to raise money to pay you. You wind up
writing off a lot of fees. The larger, more established companies
pay the bills and make it possible to take on the startup clients,
some (but not all) of whom will eventually pay.96
Another North Carolina lawyer observed that
[a] lot of the work we do puts us at risk of not ever getting paid.
Sometimes we’ll assume that risk knowingly, as when a serial
entrepreneur has a really hot startup. We’ll run a tab and count on
the funding to come through at some point. Other times we’ll just
do it for pleasure and hope for the best.97
The New York attorneys told a similar story. One lawyer
commented on the role of fee deferral in helping early-stage businesses
grow: “We will defer fees, depending on the situation, up to a certain
amount until funding or revenue comes in. It makes no sense for clients
to spend their limited cash on us instead of building the business early
on.”98 Another attorney remarked,
We defer billing with most clients, but many of those clients come
to us with a deal on the table, so we’re confident we’ll get paid
shortly. Otherwise, we can defer up to a certain amount and have
a conversation about getting paid above that amount if the legal
needs are outpacing collections by too much.99

95. Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 59.
96. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, supra note 43.
97. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36.
98. Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, supra note 52; see also Interview
with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48 (“We will defer fees until money is
raised but not all the time.”).
99. Interview with Attorney III, New York Law Firm I, supra note 91.
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A third New York attorney highlighted the risks of deferral and the
steps taken to minimize those risks:
We do end up writing off a significant amount of fees for clients
where we’ve deferred, and they end up not raising money, but we
try to limit that by selecting only clients we think will raise money,
and it usually all comes out in the wash. The deferments are also
limited in time and amount so that it doesn’t become a substantial
credit risk for us.100
The risk that a law firm will not be paid by its startup clients is real.
This risk is much less salient when corporate lawyers represent more
established business entities because these entities (by definition) have a
reliable revenue stream. Startup lawyers are, therefore, unique among
lawyers who represent for-profit corporations in that they face a
material risk of nonpayment every time they take on a new client. In
response, these attorneys have devised billing schemes that address this
problem.
b.

Equity Compensation

In order to address the risk of nonpayment, some law firms will
take equity in their startup clients.101 In so doing, these law firms are
casting their lot with their client. If the startup is a success, the firm will
participate in the upside. If the startup fails, the firm will likely receive
nothing. This arrangement recasts the attorney in the role of venture
capitalist. The attorney must decide whether the client’s prospects are
good enough to warrant giving up its status as a trade creditor and
becoming a stockholder. The outcome of this assessment will vary
depending on the client. As one North Carolina lawyer put it, “I have
the worst business model in America. Almost no one can afford to pay
me when they come in. Good teams are worth the risk, though. If I
really like the deal, I’ll take a small equity stake and defer fees.”102
Another North Carolina lawyer offered a somewhat more detailed
explanation of his decision whether to take equity in a client:
We do take equity in some companies but not significant amounts.
When and how much depends on the risk profile of the client.
There is risk in money (fees accrued and written off) and risk in
lost time. We may give the client a credit of $20–25k for one year
100. Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, supra note 46.
101. See generally Casey Perrino, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: What to Do
When One Must Take Equity in a Client, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 825 (2015) (discussing
ethical issues that arise when law firms take equity in clients).
102. Interview with Attorney II, North Carolina Law Firm III, supra note 70.
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in exchange for 1–2% up front. The way these things go, six or
seven of these companies will be wallpaper. The other three to
four will hit. We try to cover the fees for the $20–25k we wrote off
by getting a good return on the ones that hit.103
It is not, however, always so easy. Just as Groucho Marx once observed
that he would never want to belong to a club that would admit him as a
member,104 one North Carolina lawyer pointed out that those clients
who were willing to give their lawyers an equity stake were—as a
general matter—not the ones in which the law firms wanted to invest. In
his words,
We do take equity in our clients. . . . There is a deferral of initial
fees, and we take equity in the company. That being said, the
practice of taking equity in a client is less ingrained here than in
some other places. And the best companies don’t want to do it. So
there’s an adverse selection problem. . . . The clients in which you
would most like to take equity won’t agree to it.105
Another North Carolina attorney observed that the willingness of some
startups to trade their equity for legal services varied by region:
Very occasionally, we will take equity in a client but usually not.
This is a big difference between North Carolina and the Valley. If
a North Carolina lawyer asks for equity, the client is offended. We
deal with some companies in the Valley that offer equity. Their
view is that they want us to have a stake in them and have us be
part of the team. That practice just never took off in North
Carolina.106
In North Carolina, therefore, some startup lawyers will agree to take
equity in their startup clients. This practice is not, however, universally
followed.107
103. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm IV, supra note 36.
104. I Don’t Want to Belong to Any Club That Will Accept Me as a Member, QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/04/18/groucho-resigns/ [http://perma.cc
/NLP5-PKZT].
105. Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm II, supra note 44.
106. Interview with Attorney, North Carolina Law Firm I, supra note 45. Informal
conversations the authors had with practitioners in Silicon Valley who had extensive
knowledge of current and historic billing practices confirmed that the practice of taking equity
in exchange for services has declined significantly since the dot-com era, particularly among
the top-tier startup law firms in Silicon Valley.
107. See Interview with Attorney I, North Carolina Law Firm III, supra note 43 (“I’m just
uncomfortable taking equity. I’ve done it but rarely.”). One North Carolina lawyer was
prohibited from taking equity by his law firm. See Telephone Interview with Attorney I,
North Carolina Law Firm V, supra note 53 (“We have a firm policy that taking equity is a
conflict of interest, so we don’t do it.”)
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The practices reported by the New York lawyers in this respect
were very different. One of them expressly invoked the adverse
selection problem to explain why he does not strike equity-for-services
arrangements: “Generally the companies that want to pay me in equity,
there’s a reason they’re cash strapped. The ones that don’t offer that are
the ones whose equity you want.”108 A second New York lawyer found
that taking equity in a client made him less rational when deciding
whether to continue the representation of a failing company: “We don’t
take equity. It creates weird incentives to keep working for businesses
that might not warrant it. We still occasionally see some companies out
West that had previous law firms that took equity for services (with
vesting).”109 A third New York attorney believes the practice of
investing cash in clients better aligns the attorney and client than does
taking equity in exchange for legal services:
If we were good at picking the winners and losers, we’d be
investors full-time. We’re better at following smart investors (by
investing small amounts in those rounds). I also never want to
negotiate with my clients. I never want them to feel like we’re
opposite them.110
Still, another New York lawyer agreed that it was better for lawyers to
pay cash for any equity they receive but for a different reason:
[W]e don’t think it’s appropriate to crowd out a startup’s cap table
for no money. We advise clients not to freely give away their
equity, and that should include giving it to us. We will invest in a
client’s early-stage rounds at the same price and on the same
terms as a VC, but in small amounts.111
There are, in short, divergent practices between startup lawyers in New
York City and North Carolina when it comes to taking equity in startup
clients in lieu of cash for legal services rendered.
III. THE MIGRATION OF WEST COAST NORMS
There exist several noteworthy differences in the way that startup
lawyers practice in different parts of the country. In North Carolina,
startup lawyers rarely screen their clients on the basis of any criteria
other than the ability to pay for services rendered. In New York and
Silicon Valley, by contrast, startup lawyers routinely screen their clients

108.
109.
110.
111.

Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm II, supra note 76.
Interview with Attorney IV, New York Law Firm I, supra note 64.
Interview with Attorney V, New York Law Firm I, supra note 47.
Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm I, supra note 46.
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based on various criteria. In New York, and increasingly in Silicon
Valley, startup lawyers are not taking equity in their clients in exchange
for services, though many will invest cash in select clients in connection
with financing rounds led by prominent venture investors. In North
Carolina, by comparison, it is more common for startup lawyers to take
equity in their clients when they agree to represent them. These
differences suggest that significant regional variations in startup
lawyering practice may still exist.
How can one explain these variations? For decades, scholars and
industry observers found vastly different approaches to startup investing
and lawyering based on geography, with significant variations in practice
correlated with the locations of the startup, the VCs, and their respective
lawyers.112 They framed these differences in terms of a dichotomy: West
Coast vs. East Coast—i.e., Silicon Valley vs. Boston, the two primary
tech hubs for much of the history of venture capital.113 As startup
ecosystems across the country have continued to develop and mature,
we believe that this dichotomy may no longer adequately describe the
variations we observed in startup lawyering in different geographical
regions.
To help explain why, it may be instructive to briefly consider the
shifting landscape of venture capital contract terms. Scholars and
practitioners alike have long maintained that geography and culture play
an important role when it comes to shaping the terms of venture capital
contracts.114 The conventional wisdom explaining the East Coast/West
Coast divide held that contracts on the West Coast were more favorable
to the company because the Silicon Valley VCs viewed their relationship
with portfolio companies as a “partnership[.]”115 Contracts on the East
112. For a sampling of the literature, see Robert P. Bartlett, III, Commentary, 51 ARIZ. L.
REV. 47, 53–54 (2009); Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—The Role of
Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 265, 277
(2006); Dana M. Warren, Venture Capital Investment: Status and Trends, 7 OHIO ST.
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 12 (2012); Sarah Reed, Will West Ever Meet East?, BUS. L.
TODAY, May–June 2002, at 24, 24; Anne Marie Borrego, East vs. West: Location, Location,
Location, INC.COM (Dec. 1, 1999), http://www.inc.com/articles/1999/12/15732.html [https://
perma.cc/9ZDV-UJ99].
113. See Bartlett, supra note 112, at 53–54; Booth, supra note 112, at 277–78; Warren,
supra note 112, at 12; Reed, supra note 112, at 24; Borrego, supra note 112.
114. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 112 (discussing how the East Coast and West Coast
differentiate in financing term sheets); Ola Bengtsson & S. Abraham Ravid, The Geography
of Venture Capital Contracts 1 (March 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361827 [https://perma.cc/FRH4-W5XW (staff-uploaded
archive)] (analyzing the geographical and regional elements that influence contract terms) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
115. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 2, at 700 (quoting a Silicon Valley attorney as
stating that venture financing “is not an adversarial process” and that “[p]eople who view it
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Coast, by contrast, were said to contain deal terms that were less
favorable to the company because East Coast VCs took a more “bankerlike” approach to their portfolio companies.116
There is evidence to suggest, however, that repeated exposure to
companies in Silicon Valley resulted in East Coast VCs adopting more
company-friendly deal terms in subsequent deals.117 The more deals that
East Coast VCs did in Silicon Valley, in other words, the more their deal
terms came to resemble the terms used by their counterparts on the
West Coast.
Our research indicates that a similar effect may occur when it comes
to startup lawyering practices—that West Coast startup lawyering
practices have increasingly migrated to other startup ecosystems,
resulting in the decreasing relevance of the East Coast/West Coast
dichotomy. The key distinction for lawyering practice in the startup
space today relies less on geography and more on whether a lawyer is
what we would call a “startup law aficionado”—someone who is in-theknow and steeped in startup community norms.118 Startup law
aficionados, in our view, are lawyers that are primarily in the business of
representing venture-backed startups and who see significant startup
deal flow, as opposed to lawyers that practice on the periphery of startup
ecosystems, only occasionally representing early-stage businesses, angel

properly . . . realize that they are creating a very long-term partnership between the venture
capitalists on the one hand and the entrepreneurs on the other”).
116. See Bengtsson & Ravid, supra note 114, at 3. Specifically, Bengtsson and Ravid found
that contracts involving East Coast VCs were more likely to grant the investors (1) cumulative
dividends, (2) a right of redemption, and (3) participating preferred stock. See id. at 36 tbl.3B.
117. Bengtsson and Ravid hypothesize that the geographic disparities that they identify
are attributable to three factors. First, they speculate that startups have more leverage to
negotiate terms in markets, such as Silicon Valley, where there is a high concentration of highquality VCs competing for access to promising startups. Id. at 22. Second, they note that the
regional customs and norms of Silicon Valley may shape the way that companies and VCs in
that region view the venture capital relationship. Id. Third, they surmise that the proximity of
Silicon Valley VCs to companies in that region reduces monitoring costs. Id. Since monitoring
costs are relatively low, they argue, Silicon Valley VCs rely less on contractual provisions to
protect their interests in their portfolio companies. See id. at 20–21. Bengtsson and Ravid
ultimately conclude that venture capital contracts are not influenced solely by determinants,
such as agency costs. See id. at 21. Culture and geography also play a role in shaping the terms
of these agreements. Id.
118. See, e.g., Interview with Attorney II, New York Law Firm I, supra note 52 (“Having
firms who do this type of work regularly on the other side makes the process much easier than
going up against a family-friend lawyer or generalist who doesn’t understand the startup
practice.”); Interview with Attorney IV, New York Law Firm I, supra note 64 (“Lawyers who
aren’t in this business make everything harder . . . . I’d always rather see a venture lawyer I
know on the other side because I don’t have to educate them on doing these deals and what’s
important.”); Interview with Attorney I, New York Law Firm III, supra note 48 (“It matters
whether the other lawyers know what they’re doing; it’s not a geography issue.”).
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investors, or nontraditional VC investors. Startup law aficionados can be
found in any geographical region, though they tend to be clustered in
technology hubs. Silicon Valley is still such a center of gravity in the
startup world that startup law aficionados outside the Bay Area will
inevitably come into contact with Silicon Valley startup lawyers and
venture investors. As this occurs, the lawyering practices of startup law
aficionados outside of Silicon Valley increasingly reflect those of their
counterparts in Silicon Valley—and we predict that repeated exposure
will only increase the effect.
One possible explanation for the greater degree of convergence
with Silicon Valley practices that we found in New York as compared
with the Research Triangle, therefore, is that startup practice in New
York is increasingly dominated by law firms with strong ties to Silicon
Valley. Startup legal practice in North Carolina, by comparison, is more
isolated from Silicon Valley, dominated by firms that are based in the
Southeast. While these firms employ a number of lawyers who cut their
teeth at firms in Silicon Valley, they also employ a great many lawyers
who did not. This latter group of lawyers may, therefore, be less steeped
in West Coast norms than those who began their practice on the West
Coast or those who regularly interact with West Coast lawyers and
investors. As a result, the startup lawyers in New York and the Research
Triangle may simply be at different stages along the path of convergence
with Silicon Valley startup lawyering practices and norms.
CONCLUSION
In the technology world, it is common to assign version numbers to
software upgrades. These numbers generally correspond to new
developments in the software and enable end users to identify the most
up-to-date version of a particular program. In the realm of startup
lawyering, there is no versioning equivalent, which means the evolution
of attorney practice is more difficult to track. To the extent that trends
are discernible, however, it would appear that the act of providing legal
services to early-stage technology companies outside of Silicon Valley
today is different in a number of respects from the act of providing
similar services to companies within Silicon Valley in the early 1990s. At
the same time, the work of a startup lawyer retains many of the core
features that defined this earlier era. The advent of Startup Lawyering
2.0 thus represents a difference in degree—rather than a difference in
kind—from the era that preceded it.

